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Language as joint action
A B S T R A C T
Interference in picture naming occurs from representing a partner's preparations to speak (Gambi, van de Cavey,
& Pickering, 2015). We tested the origins of this interference using a simple non-communicative joint naming
task based on Gambi et al. (2015), where response latencies indexed interference from partner task and partner
speech content, and eye fixations to partner objects indexed overt attention. Experiment 1 contrasted a partner-
present condition with a control partner-absent condition to establish the role of the partner in eliciting inter-
ference. For latencies, we observed interference from the partner's task and speech content, with interference
increasing due to partner task in the partner-present condition. Eye-tracking measures showed that interference
in naming was not due to overt attention to partner stimuli but to broad expectations about likely utterances.
Experiment 2 examined whether an equivalent non-verbal task also elicited interference, as predicted from a
language as joint action framework. We replicated the finding of interference due to partner task and again
found no relationship between overt attention and interference. These results support Gambi et al. (2015).
Individuals co-represent a partner's task while speaking, and doing so does not require overt attention to partner
stimuli.
1. Introduction
Conversation has been seen as a form of joint action: it involves two
or more people coordinating their actions—speaking, gesturing, and
other types of non-verbal behavior—to reach the common goal of un-
derstanding each other. Research on joint motor action has shown that
in order for people to act jointly, each agent must represent and predict
the other's actions (see e.g. Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011). Many
authors have argued that the same is true for conversation (e.g., Clark,
1996; Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2013). Representation of the partner's
upcoming utterances is, for instance, often seen as a prerequisite of
smooth turn-taking (e.g., Levinson, 2016; Levinson & Torreira, 2015).
An important question arising from this view of conversation concerns
the nature of the representations that interlocutors generate of their
partners' utterance plans. Too little representation of the partner's ut-
terance plan could lead to insufficient coordination to converse
smoothly, while too much representation may be costly and lead to
interference in speech planning. In the current experiments, we tracked
the allocation of speakers' overt visual attention to objects named by a
partner and measured interference in speech planning to assess how the
speakers represented their interlocutors' utterances. The overarching
goal was to provide insight into the mechanisms that support con-
versation.
Earlier work by Gambi, van de Cavey, and Pickering (2015) showed
that speakers performing a joint naming task represented the partner's
task, i.e. whether or not the partner also had to name objects, but not
the content of the partner's speech plan. This suggests that what is ideal
for conversation may involve only minimally representing a partner's
plan. The current work followed directly from this study, using a sim-
plified version of the Gambi et al. (2015) paradigm. As such, we begin
by describing their procedure and results in detail.
In the Gambi et al. (2015) paradigm, two participants were seated in
separate rooms and asked to name colored superimposed pictures in a
particular order (e.g. a large apple in red, with a smaller blouse in blue
nested inside, eliciting the response apple, blouse). Participants were
cued with a screen of instructions before each trial as to whether their
partner was either naming the pictures (in the same order or the op-
posite order) or performing a different task (withholding a response or
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deciding whether the two pictures belonged to the same semantic ca-
tegory). The goal of the experiments was to examine whether in-
dividuals only represented that the partner was or was not also engaged
in a naming task, or whether they represented the content of the
partner's utterances as well.
Gambi and colleagues' Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 examined
how the average onset latency and accuracy of two-word utterances
were affected by the task a partner was simultaneously performing. In
Experiment 1, the authors contrasted the degree of interference in
naming that occurred when a partner was naming the same two pic-
tures in the same order, naming the same two pictures in a different
order, or producing no response. Individuals took longer to name their
own pictures when they believed their partner was also naming, versus
withholding a response. For the naming latencies, there was no effect of
the content of the partner's utterance, with no difference in latencies
between the same-order or different-order conditions. However, in-
dividuals did produce more errors when they believed their partner was
preparing a different response. This suggests that individuals received
more interference in naming from representing a partner's task than the
content of their speech. Experiment 2 replaced the no-response condi-
tion with a categorization task in which the individual had to state
whether the two pictures belonged to the same semantic category using
a verbal yes/no response. Again, naming latencies were slower when
the partner was believed to be naming than categorizing. However,
there was no effect of the content of the partner's utterance (same-
picture versus different-picture condition) on either naming latencies or
error rates. This provides further support for the claim that individuals
derived more interference from representing the partner's task than the
content of their speech.
Gambi and colleagues' Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 examined
how the onset latency and accuracy of one-word utterances were af-
fected by the partner's task. Experiment 3 used identical pictures to
Experiments 1 and 2 but required the participant to name only one of
them, contrasting a same-picture condition with different-picture and
no-response conditions. This experiment showed no evidence for in-
terference from either partner task or partner utterance on naming la-
tencies or error rates. Experiment 4 used the same design as Experiment
3 but visually degraded the pictures to make naming more difficult.
This replicated Experiment 1: naming latencies were slower when the
partner was believed to also be naming than not responding. More er-
rors were again produced when the partner was believed to be produ-
cing a different response, though only when the partner's picture was
the larger of the two nested objects.
In sum, the results from Gambi et al. (2015) clearly demonstrated
that participants represented whether or not their partner was
speaking. In addition, error patterns and the latencies in Experiment 4
suggested that the content of partner utterances may also be occa-
sionally or weakly represented. This suggests that individuals formed a
partial co-representation of the partner's utterance across multiple le-
vels, representing the fact that speech was occurring and also re-
presenting a sparse amount of information about the speech content.
The fact that naming interference was observed at all is intriguing
given that the task in Gambi et al. (2015) was non-communicative, with
no joint task goals, and given that the two interlocutors sat in different
rooms. This means that there was no direct benefit to representing the
partner's speech plan, and participants could have in fact completely
ignored the partner without any consequences for their task perfor-
mance. One possible explanation for these results is therefore that co-
representation arises from fundamental, automatic processes activated
when another person is perceived as important for participating in a
joint task, even if they are not present in the same room (see e.g. Kuhlen
& Rahman, 2017, for supporting results). Another possible explanation
is that the specific pattern of co-representation arose due to specific
parameters of the paradigm, such as the trial-specific instructions
(serving to provide a clear reminder of the participant and partner's
tasks before each trial) or the stimulus design (presenting two nested
objects, making it hard to ignore the partner items). Our experiments
were designed to follow up on these two possibilities, examining the
role of co-presence on interference in naming in a simplified paradigm.
In particular, we wanted to establish whether task and/or content in-
terference appears in a simplified, less demanding version of the
paradigm where the partner was physically co-present. We also mea-
sured the amount of overt visual attention that partner objects received
by recording the participants' eye movements. This allowed us to ex-
amine what individuals represent about a partner's preparations to
speak, disentangling whether co-representations can be formed from
expectations about what is likely given the task paradigm versus from
overt visual attention to objects.
1.1. Current study
The goal of the current studies was to examine interference in a
simplified version of the joint naming task developed by Gambi et al.
(2015). Following earlier work (e.g. Gambi et al., 2015; Hoedemaker,
Ernst, Meyer, & Belke, 2017; Hoedemaker & Meyer, 2019; Kuhlen &
Rahman, 2017), we presented individuals with pictures to name or
categorize and varied properties of the partner stimulus, partner task,
and whether there was a partner present during the experimental ses-
sion. We based the paradigm on Gambi et al. (2015), making changes to
make the social context more obvious, simplify the paradigm, change
the categorization task, and to be able to make direct observations of
attention to partner objects during the experiment.
The first change made from Gambi et al. (2015) was to make the
social character of the study more obvious. Rather than being seated in
separate rooms, individuals were seated at adjacent computers at the
same table and performed the joint naming task in a partner-present
condition. Each participant wore noise-cancelling headphones so that
they could not hear their partner. This served to make the other par-
ticipant's task and intentions fully transparent while removing inter-
ference due to hearing their speech. This means that individuals did not
have to infer a partner's co-presence, but could simply observe it. In
Experiment 1, this partner-present condition was compared with a
partner-absent condition in which the participant was told their partner
was unable to attend the experiment. This condition provided a base-
line with the same visual and task-level complexity, but without any
social co-presence.
As in the Gambi et al. (2015) experiments, we asked our participants
to perform naming and categorization tasks on identical and different
pictures. However, we blocked these conditions rather than inter-
leaving trials of different types. Each block was preceded by instruc-
tions that stated what the task would be for each participant (naming or
categorizing) and whether the two pictures would be identical or dif-
ferent. This made it so that instructions did not need to appear before
each trial, creating a faster and more natural flow. In particular, when
both participants were naming, participants might easily conceptualize
their task as something analogous to reading aloud together.
In our experiments, we elicited utterances requiring attention to
only one object, like in Experiments 3 and 4 of Gambi et al. (2015). Our
naming task required naming only one picture, and our categorization
task required participants to determine the category of only their pic-
ture. This was done to further simplify the paradigm and to allow
participants to ignore the partner object if desired, providing a strong
test for the automaticity of partner co-representations when not re-
quired to perform the task.
The categorization task we used was to decide whether the object
was living or not living. In Experiment 1, the judgement was provided
using a verbal response, while in Experiment 2, the judgement was
provided using a forced-choice button press. This judgement required
an identical decision on the part of the participant, but required a
simple motor action instead of speaking (see e.g., Knoblich et al., 2011
for an in-depth review of interference in motor action). We varied the
output modality in order to disentangle the source of action co-
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representations, asking whether individuals specifically represented
that their partner is speaking, versus performing another type of action.
Another difference from Gambi et al. (2015) was that we physically
separated the two objects, presenting one object on the left side of the
screen for one participant and one on the right side for the other par-
ticipant. The participant seated on the left was tasked with naming or
categorizing the left picture, while the participant seated on the right
was tasked with naming or categorizing the right picture. This meant
that it was always obvious what each participant should say, but the
partner object was also always truly irrelevant to the participant's task
and easy to ignore if the participant desired to do so.
Separating the two objects also allowed us to collect an additional
dependent measure of interference that provided further insight into
what sources of information were used to form partner co-representa-
tions. We recorded individual's fixations to partner objects in order to
track allocation of overt visual attention to competitors during pro-
cessing (e.g. Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995;
see Hoedemaker & Meyer, 2019, for use of eye-tracking in a joint
naming task). Eye-tracking allowed us to test whether overt attention to
the partner object was associated with interference in naming. If at-
tention is directly related to interference in naming, the same patterns
should be observed on naming latencies and odds of fixating the partner
object. Specifically, interference should occur most strongly for dif-
ferent-picture trials when individuals fixated their partner's picture
prior to initiating their own response, compared to trials where there
was no fixation or only post-speech onset fixations to the partner pic-
ture. Collecting this additional dependent measure therefore provided
insight into the source and strength of representations activated during
naming.
To summarize, Experiment 1 contrasted joint naming in a partner-
present condition, in which two participants performed their task side-
by-side, with a partner-absent condition, in which one participant
performed the task alone. In both conditions, participants named or
categorized one picture from a two-picture display, and in the display
were either two copies of the same picture or two different pictures.
These manipulations were blocked, so that on a given block of trials, all
picture pairs were either identical or different for the two participants,
and participants either both named or one participant named while the
other categorized the pictures.
The goal of Experiment 1 was to assess whether individuals were
more susceptible to interference in naming from the non-target object
in the partner-present than in the partner-absent condition, which
would indicate representation of the partner's task in a social situation
(e.g., as in the joint action framework outlined by Knoblich et al., 2011;
Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; Vesper et al., 2017, and discussed
by Gambi et al., 2015). Specifically, we predicted that co-representation
of partner task would lead to an interaction between partner presence
(present/absent) and partner task (naming/categorizing), with a
stronger effect of partner task in the partner-present condition. Like-
wise, we predicted that co-representation of the partner's task content
would lead to an interaction between partner presence and picture
congruence (same versus different pictures), with a stronger effect of
picture congruence in the partner-present condition. Finally, if inter-
ference in naming latencies is caused by active deployment of visual
attention to partner pictures, we also predicted that frequent gazes to
the partner's picture should be associated with strong partner task and
picture congruence effects.
We found that Experiment 1 yielded longer latencies in the partner-
present different task than in the partner-present same-task condition,
as predicted by a language as joint action framework. The goal of
Experiment 2 was to replicate this pattern while requiring a manual
response in the categorization task rather than a verbal one. We pre-
dicted no effect of partner task if the actions that drive interference are
specific to verbal responses, such that only minimal interference should
be observed for partner-categorize trials relative to the naming trials
when the response is non-verbal. In contrast, we predicted a main effect
of partner task if what matters is purely that the partner is acting, such
that robust interference in naming latencies would be observed in




In the first experiment, participants were assigned to one of two
conditions: a partner-present condition, in which two participants
performed the same non-communicative naming task in parallel while
wearing noise-cancelling headphones, and a partner-absent condition,
in which the setup was identical (including two computers displaying
stimuli) but only one participant performed the task. Within these be-
tween-participants conditions, we manipulated the tasks of the parti-
cipant and their partner (naming, categorizing), and the congruence of
the two stimuli (same, different). If participants represent only their
partner's actions, we expect interference based upon partner task but
not picture congruence; if participants also represent the content of




A sample size of 96 participants was selected based upon an a-priori
power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007), which suggested that 48 participants in each of the between-
participant groups would allow observation of an effect f of 0.1 or
larger (a small effect size in an ANOVA-style design). 102 participants
between the ages of 18 and 30 years (mean age 22 years) were recruited
from the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics's database. Six
participants were excluded due to calibration issues, track loss, or audio
recording failure.
The final sample of 96 participants (71 female) reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and no speech or hearing problems, and
received a payment of 6 € for their participation. Informed consent was
obtained from each participant. Of the 96 participants, half were as-
signed to the partner-absent condition and half to the partner-present
condition. The study was approved by the ethics board of the Faculty of
Social Sciences of Radboud University.
2.2.2. Materials
Experimental stimuli consisted of thirty black and white line
drawings of objects, normed in Belgian Dutch by Severens, van
Lommel, Ratinckx, and Hartsuiker (2005), sized to 200×200 pixels
(3.39° visual angle). Of these, 15 were ‘living’ (in Dutch: levend; five
tokens each of animals, fruit, and vegetables) and 15 were non-living
(in Dutch: niet levend; five tokens each of clothing, furniture, and ve-
hicles). Object names were mono-, di- or tri-syllabic, with the number
of syllables not differing between categories (p=0.15). See Appendix A
for list of stimuli.
Living and non-living items were matched between sets (all p values
above 0.07) based on the Severens et al. (2005) norms for name
agreement (mean 91%, range 54% to 100%,), log word frequency
(mean 1.48, range 0.48 to 3.58), and mean naming time (mean 925ms,
range 694ms to 1252ms), as well as on visual complexity, as de-
termined by JPEG file size (mean 15.25, range 5.8 to 24.5). Objects
were also assessed for name agreement by six native speakers of Dutch
from the Netherlands. This assessment showed that one object from
Severens et al. (2005) had a different preferred name in standard Dutch
(stoel instead of sessel); we had participants use this name instead.
2.2.3. Design
Images were presented on two computer monitors with identical
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displays, as shown in Fig. 1. The left object was designated for the
participant on the left, and the right object designated for the partici-
pant on the right, but both participants were free to view their partner's
object on their own monitor. Items were presented in six blocks of 30
trials each.
At the beginning of each block, participants were given a screen of
instructions informing them of their task and their partner's task. As in
Fig. 1, the instructions NAME your picture or CATEGORIZE your picture
(in Dutch: BENOEM je plaatje/CATEGORISEER je plaatje) were displayed
on the left and right sides of the screen, and the text SAME picture or
DIFFERENT pictures (HETZELFDE plaatje/VERSCHILLENDE plaatjes) was
displayed at the top of the screen. In one-third of the blocks, both
participants named, while in the other two-thirds, one participant
named while the other categorized; this meant that each participant
performed the naming task on two-thirds of trials. A condition in which
both participants categorized the items was not included because the
goal of the experiment was to examine naming latencies and in such a
condition, neither of the participants would contribute a naming la-
tency. Task was crossed with object type such that in three blocks,
participants saw the same objects, and in three blocks, they saw dif-
ferent objects, which were from different semantic categories to exclude
any semantic relatedness effects. Block order was counterbalanced
across lists, such that each type of block appeared in each position of
the experiment; two randomized orders of items were created for each
block to make twelve experimental lists.
2.2.4. Procedure
In the partner-present condition, two participants were simulta-
neously invited to the lab and introduced to each other. In the partner-
absent condition, one participant came to the lab and was told that
while the task would normally involve a partner, their partner was not
able to attend the experiment and they would therefore be taking part
alone. Other than this, the experimental setup, task, and apparatus were
identical between conditions, with an experimental script always pre-
senting stimuli to both computers.
The experiment began with a familiarization phase in which parti-
cipants were shown the 30 objects and their names and categories
(printed underneath). Objects were displayed centrally for 4000ms
each with 200ms inter-stimulus intervals. Next, participants were
asked to put on a unidirectional microphone headset and a pair of
noise-cancelling headphones, which played continuous Pink noise in
order to mask the partner's response. Participants were then seated
against a forehead rest to maintain position about 90 cm from the
monitor. After calibration, there were six ‘same object’ practice trials
consisting of three trials in which both participants named apple, bi-
cycle, and hat, and three in which both participants categorized snake,
table, and carrot. This practice phase also served to test the noise-can-
celling headphones; at the end of the practice phase, the Pink noise
volume was adjusted as needed to mask the partner's response.
Following the practice phase were the six blocks of the experiment.
Before each block, participants saw a screen which informed them
whether the pictures would be the same or different, and which in-
structed each participant to either name or categorize their picture.
Trials began with fixation points on the appropriate sides of the screen
for each participant; the experimenter manually registered each parti-
cipant's fixation. When both participants' fixations were registered, the
trial sequence was triggered. It consisted of a blank screen, shown for
500ms, then the stimuli, shown for 1000ms, and then another blank
screen, shown for 900ms. Between blocks, a blank screen was pre-
sented for five seconds. The experimental session lasted approximately
20min.
2.2.5. Apparatus
Participants were seated side-by-side in front of identical 24" display
monitors (1920×1080 resolution). On each monitor, two stimuli were
presented on opposite sides of the screen with a center-to-center dis-
tance of 36 cm (22.62° visual angle); this distance combined with the
visual angle of the stimuli (3.39°) meant that when fixating one picture,
participant were highly unlikely to be able to identify the other picture
using peripheral vision. Stimulus presentation was controlled by SR
Research Experiment Builder software (Version 1.10.1630) on a BenQ
computer. Pink noise was played through an Olympus LS-10 Linear
PCM recorder connected to two pairs of noise-cancelling headphones
(Audio Technica ANC70 Quiet Point) and speech was recorded using a
Shure SM10A head-mounted microphone.
Eye movements were tracked with an eye-tracking system including
Fig. 1. Sample displays and trial sequence. Fixation point appears on opposite side for other participant.
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two host computers, two trackers (EyeLink 1000 Plus Desktop Mount,
Version 5.09), and two display computers. Throughout the experiment,
the host computers recorded participants' fixations and synchronized
the display to the two participants. The right eye of each participant
was tracked at 500 hertz with a spatial accuracy of about 0.25° to 0.5°.
Areas of interest were defined as the 200×200 pixel square containing
each object.
2.2.6. Data analysis
Utterance onset was analyzed for all trials in which participants
correctly named or categorized their object. Latencies were defined as
the time from stimulus onset to response onset; these were hand-coded
by the second author using Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2017). Data
were analyzed with mixed-effects models using the lme4 package, ver-
sion 1.1–18 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) in R version
3.5.1 (R Core Team, 2018). Primary dependent measures were log-
transformed naming latencies and odds of fixating one or more times on
the partner object during naming trials. Log-transformed categorization
latencies and odds of fixating one or more times on the partner object
during categorizing trials served as secondary dependent measures and
are reported in Appendix B. Predictors were partner presence (present/
absence), partner task (name/categorize), and picture congruence
(same/different), all contrast coded as – 0.5 and 0.5.
All models were initially fit with a maximal random effects struc-
ture, including random intercepts by participant, speaker picture and
partner picture, and random slopes by participant, speaker picture and
partner picture for partner presence, partner task and picture con-
gruence and their interactions. This structure was simplified due to non-
convergence to reflect the maximal random effects structure justified by
the data by removing the higher-order terms that accounted for the
least variance, removing interactions first and then main effects as
necessary (see Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Random slopes
correlated above 0.9 were also removed to avoid overfitting. For linear
models, p-values were obtained by model comparison.
2.3. Results
Participants fluently produced the intended response on 97% of the
naming trials. The remaining 3% (538 trials, of which 56% were in the
partner-present condition) were excluded from further analysis. On
these trials, the participant performed the wrong task (90 trials), used a
non-target name (187 trials), produced a disfluent response (217 trials),
or produced no response (44 trials). No statistical analyses of these low
error rates were performed.
2.3.1. Naming latencies
As shown in Fig. 2, naming latencies were affected by partner task in
the form of interactions between partner task and the other two vari-
ables. In the partner-present condition, trials on which the partner was
categorizing elicited a slower average naming latency (M=723ms)
than trials on which the partner was naming (M=707ms). In the
partner-absent condition, this was not the case (partner-categorizing:
M=713ms, vs partner-naming: M=722ms). In addition, partner-
naming trials on which the pictures differed elicited a slower average
naming latency (M=723ms) than trials where the pictures were
identical (M=706ms); for partner-categorizing trials, a trend in the
opposite direction was seen (same: M=723ms, vs different:
M=713ms). These patterns were confirmed statistically in a linear
mixed effect model (see Table 1). Critically, no other main effects or
interactions were reliable: naming latencies were statistically equiva-
lent in the partner-present (M=715ms) and partner-absent
(M=717ms) conditions, as well as in the same-picture (M=714ms)
and different-picture (M=718) conditions.
2.3.2. Partner fixations
Most trials had no fixations to the partner object, with one or more
fixations to the partner object on only 7.7% of trials. First, we tabulated
whether these fixations to partner pictures occurred before or after
onset of speech by merging the eye-tracking fixation data with the onset
latencies coded for each trial. This was done because information
gained from fixations to partner objects could only affect naming la-
tencies if the fixation occurred prior to speech onset. Individuals fixated
the partner object one or more times before the onset of their own
speech on only 1.36% of trials. This means that the large majority of the
fixations to the partner object occurred after speech onset, indicating
that overt visual attention to partner objects could not be the source of
interference in naming.
For naming trials, we also examined how odds of fixating the
partner object at any point in the trial were modulated by experimental
condition. These results are displayed in Fig. 3. Regardless of partner
presence, individuals were more likely to fixate the partner object on
partner-naming than on partner-categorization trials (9.3%, vs 6.5% of
trials). Moreover, regardless of partner presence, individuals fixated the
partner object more often when it was different from their own object
rather than identical (9.0% vs 7.7% of trials). These patterns were
confirmed with a logistic mixed effect model (see Table 2). The fitted
model contained only main effects and no interactions; due to the
sparse number of fixations to partner objects, a model containing all
main effects and interactions failed to converge.
2.4. Discussion
In Experiment 1, we investigated how participants' naming latencies
and gaze patterns were affected by the physical co-presence of a task
partner, by the match or mismatch of the participants' tasks, and by the
match or mismatch of the two partners' stimuli. We did not observe a
significant main effect of partner presence on any dependent measure:
speakers did not differ in speed or accuracy based upon partner pre-
sence, nor did they look more often at the partner's object when the
partner was present than when they were absent. This is consistent with
earlier studies in our lab indicating that participants carry out simple
picture naming tasks in a similar fashion in monologue and dialogue
situations (Hoedemaker & Meyer, 2019; Meyer, Alday, Decuyper, &
Knudsen, 2018).
We predicted that if individuals co-represent their partner's task,
there should be an interaction between partner presence and partner
task, and if individuals co-represent their partner's speech content,
there should be an interaction between partner presence and picture
congruence. We observed the predicted interaction of partner presence
and partner task. In the partner-present condition, participants were
faster to name pictures when the partner was also naming than when
they were categorizing. This indicates that participants represented the
partner's actions, leading to interference in naming when the actions
were different. While the presence of an effect of partner task replicates
Gambi et al. (2015), the direction of the effect was reversed. This dis-
crepancy could have arisen for a variety of reasons, including the re-
lative ease of our task or the relative ease of naming versus categor-
izing. We elaborate more upon these points in the General discussion
section.
We did not observe the predicted interaction of partner presence
and picture congruence. There was no main effect of picture con-
gruence either, but there was an interaction between picture con-
gruence and partner task: Naming latencies were only faster in the
same-picture than in the different-picture condition on partner-name
trials, but not on partner-categorize trials. This follows from the fact
that it was only when both task and picture were shared that partici-
pants produced the same responses: when the tasks differed, partici-
pants produced different responses (e.g. saying “living” and “rabbit” to
the same object) regardless of whether their pictures matched.
Importantly, this pattern held regardless of partner co-presence. This
suggests that even in the partner-absent condition, participants re-
presented to some extent what the partner would have said had they
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been present. The implication is that the expected content of a partner
utterance may cause some interference in naming, even when no
partner is physically co-present.
Analyses of the participants' eye gaze showed that they largely fo-
cused on their own item: fixations to the partner's item were rare and
mostly occurred after utterance onset. This provides evidence that the
interference effect observed on naming latencies did not rely on the
deployment of overt visual attention to the partner picture. Given the
large visual angle of the two stimuli, it would have been very difficult
for the participants to identify the partner objects without fixating upon
them. Combined with the fact that participants could not hear their
partner speak, the near absence of gazes to the partner objects before
speech onset means that interference on naming latencies was not based
on knowledge of the specific word the partner would say on a given
trial. Instead, interference may derive from knowing and representing
the partner's task (naming or categorizing the same or different pic-
tures), as this information was provided in the block instructions.
Throughout the whole duration of the trial, partner object fixations
were more frequent in the different-picture condition, where the picture
provided new information to the participant, than in the same-picture
condition, suggesting that overt visual attention to partner objects was
deployed more often when it could yield novel information. Fixations to
the partner's object were also slightly more frequent on trials where
both participants were naming, compared to trials where the partner
was categorizing. It is not clear why this difference arose. One might
speculate that the participants perceived the partner-naming condition
more strongly as a joint task, akin to speaking in chorus, and conse-
quently considered the partner's object to be more task-relevant. It is
also possible that the partner-naming task condition involved a simpler
representation of the joint task (e.g., she is doing the same thing that I
am doing), meaning that participants could more easily allocate spare
attentional resources to their partner's object. Both possibilities are
consistent with the conceptualization of language as a form of joint
action.
In sum, Experiment 1 showed evidence for interference in naming
latencies based upon the partner's task in the partner-present condition,
supporting the actor co-representation account of Gambi et al. (2015)
and suggesting that the co-presence of a partner leads to interference
based upon expectations about their actions. Experiment 1 also showed
reduced interference when the two partners were producing identical
Fig. 2. Distribution of naming latencies by trial in Experiment 1 split by picture congruence (same, different), partner presence (present, absent) and partner task
(categorizing, naming). Points represent means by participant and horizontal lines reflect overall condition means.
Table 1
Linear mixed effect model for log-transformed naming latencies in Experiment
1. In the random effects tier, random slopes are nested below the corresponding
intercept.
Fixed effects Estimate SE t value p(χ2)
Intercept 6.551 0.021 314.5 < 0.001
Partner Presence (Present vs Absent) −0.007 0.020 −0.35 0.73
Partner Task (Categorizing vs. Naming) −0.004 0.007 −0.62 0.53
Picture Congruence (Same vs. Different) 0.006 0.006 1.11 0.27
Partner Presence × Partner Task −0.029 0.013 −2.17 0.03
Partner Presence × Picture Congruence 0.011 0.012 0.93 0.36
Partner Task × Picture Congruence 0.034 0.012 2.76 0.01
Partner Presence × Partner Task × Picture
Congruence
0.018 0.024 0.73 0.46
Random effects Term Variance
Speaker Picture Intercept 0.0098




Partner Task × Picture Congruence 0.0101
Residual 0.0296
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responses (the partner-name, same-picture condition), indicating that
some aspects of the content of the partner's speech were also mentally
represented, though this was not contingent on partner co-presence.
3. Experiment 2
3.1. Introduction
In Experiment 1, we observed that partner task affected naming
latencies, such that participants were faster to name pictures on
partner-name than partner-categorize trials. In this experiment, the
categorization responses were verbal responses that classified the object
as living or non-living. Therefore, it is not clear whether the task-con-
gruence effect arose because participants represented the partner's task
at an abstract conceptual level (naming or categorizing) or because they
broadly represented the linguistic content of their utterances (an ad-
jective referring to a property of the object or noun referring to a basic
level term). To distinguish between these options, Experiment 2 as-
sessed whether similar patterns of interference occurred when the
verbal categorization task used during Experiment 1 was replaced by an
equivalent forced-choice button-press task.
Previous work has demonstrated robust social interference effects
based upon the expected button-press of a partner (the ‘Social Simon
Effect’; e.g., Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003), making a button-pressing
categorization task ideal for examining socially situated interference. If
interference arose from a predicted verbal response that was in-
compatible with the participant's own verbal response, interference
should be minimal in partner-categorize trials when the partner's re-
sponse is non-verbal. In contrast, if what matters is purely the con-
ceptual properties of the partner's response (name versus categorize),
robust interference in naming should still be observed in partner-cate-
gorize trials even when the partner is producing a non-verbal response.
To simplify the experimental design, Experiment 2 included only
the partner-present condition. As in Experiment 1, the two participants
again either saw the same or different pictures. This allowed us to
evaluate whether naming latencies, accuracy, or eye gaze were affected
by picture congruence, providing a partial replication of Experiment 1.
The hypothesis was that if individuals represent their partner's task
even if it is non-verbal, we would observe a main effect of partner task.
If individuals represent their partner's response even if it is non-verbal,
we predict a main effect of picture congruence, and if individuals re-
present their partner's response only if it is verbal, we predict an in-
teraction between partner task and picture congruence.
3.2. Method
3.2.1. Participants
Based upon the power analyses reported in Experiment 1, a sample
size of 48 participants was selected. This reflects the fact that we
Fig. 3. Distribution of average proportions of fixations to partner pictures by participant in Experiment 1, split by partner presence (present, absent), picture
congruence (different, same) and partner task (categorizing, naming). Points represent means by participant; horizontal lines reflect condition means.
Table 2
Logistic mixed effect model for odds of fixating the partner object in Experiment
1 naming trials.
Fixed effects Estimate SE z value p(z)
Intercept −3.34 0.19 −17.90 < 0.001
Partner Presence (Present vs Absent) 0.25 0.35 0.71 0.48
Partner Task (Categorizing vs. Naming) 0.29 0.08 3.81 < 0.001
Picture Congruence (Same vs. Different) 0.22 0.08 2.84 0.01
Random effects Term Variance
Speaker Picture Intercept 0.00
Partner Picture Intercept 0.08
Participant Intercept 2.60
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removed the partner-absent condition; as such, this sample would still
allow us to an effect f of 0.1 or larger reliably. 58 participants between
the ages of 18 and 30 years old (mean age 23) were recruited from the
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics' database. Ten participants
were excluded due to calibration issues, track loss, or poor-quality
audio recordings. Categorization data for two participants were lost due
to a keyboard malfunction; the naming data from these individuals
were included in the reported analyses.
The final sample of 48 participants (37 female) reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and no speech or hearing problems, and
received a payment of 8 € for their participation. Informed consent was
obtained from each participant. The study was approved by the ethics
board of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Radboud University.
3.2.2. Materials and design
The same materials and design were used as in Experiment 1, except
that all participants were tested in the partner-present condition. In two
pairs of participants there was one individual who could not be cali-
brated. These two participants were excluded (as noted above) and the
data from the remaining individual in both pairs was left in the ex-
periment. These exclusions led to a small mismatch in counterbalancing
across experimental lists: the final data set contained data from five
individuals in one list, three in another, and four each in the remaining
ten lists.
3.2.3. Apparatus and procedure
The apparatus and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1,
except that participants made categorization judgments by pressing the
F key (for living) or J key (for non-living) on a computer keyboard.
Response latencies for this measure were collected during the 1000ms
interval for which the images remained present on the screen.
Participants also completed a 30 question Big IV inventory (Soto &
John, 2017; unpublished Dutch version translated, validated, and
shared by Jaap Denissen, personal communication) used in exploratory
analyses that are not reported here.
3.2.4. Data analysis
As in Experiment 1, with the omission of the partner presence
predictor. Transcriptions of sound files and annotations of onset la-
tencies for each utterance were performed by trained research assistants
and checked by the first author.
3.3. Results
Participants fluently produced the intended response on 97% of
naming trials. The remaining 3% (194 trials) were excluded from fur-
ther analysis. On these trials, the participant produced no response (58
trials), used a non-target name (126 trials), or produced a disfluent or
incomplete response (10 trials).
3.3.1. Naming latencies
We observed a main effect of partner task such that naming times
were slower on trials on which the partner was categorizing
(M=722ms) than naming (M=702ms), see Fig. 4. This was sup-
ported by a linear mixed effect model (see Table 3). No other effect was
reliable: Picture congruence did not have a significant main effect
(Different pictures M=718ms; Same pictures M=706ms), and the
interaction between partner task and picture congruence was also not
significant, with minimal differences in latencies between conditions
(Partner-name, same-picture M=697ms; Partner-name, different-pic-
ture M=708ms; Partner-categorize, same-picture M=715ms;
Partner-categorize, different-picture M=729ms).
3.3.2. Partner fixations
Participants fixated on the partner object on only 7.5% of trials. As
described in Experiment 1, we again tabulated whether looks to the
partner picture occurred before or after onset of speech. As in
Experiment 1, individuals rarely fixated the partner object before the
onset of their own speech, with fixations to partner objects before
speech onset occurring on only 0.54% of trials. This provides evidence
that the interference observed in naming latencies did not derive from
the allocation of overt visual attention to partner objects.
We also again examined how the odds of fixating partner objects at
any point in the trial were modulated by condition. As shown in Fig. 5,
individuals were significantly more likely to fixate the partner object
during naming trials when the partner was also naming (10.3%, vs
6.6% for partner-categorize trials) and when the partner object differed
from their own (9.4%, vs 7.5% for same-item trials), with no reliable
interaction between the two factors. These patterns were confirmed
with a logistic mixed-effect model (see Table 4).
Fig. 4. Distribution of naming latencies by trial in Experiment 2 split by partner
task. Points represent means by participant; horizontal lines reflect condition
means.
Table 3
Linear mixed effect model for log-transformed naming latencies in Experiment
2. In the random effects tier, random slopes are nested below the corresponding
intercept.
Fixed effects Estimate SE t value p(χ2)
Intercept 6.542 0.025 257.13 <0.001
Partner Task (Categorizing vs. Naming) −0.032 0.012 −2.66 0.01
Picture Congruence (Same vs. Different) 0.016 0.010 1.58 0.12
Partner Task × Picture Congruence −0.011 0.010 −1.05 0.29
Random effects Term Variance
Speaker Picture Intercept 0.013
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3.4. Discussion
In Experiment 2, we investigated how participants' naming latencies
and overt visual attention to simple line drawings were affected by the
match or mismatch of the participants' tasks (both participants naming,
or one participant naming while the partner categorized pictures using
a button-press task) as well as by the match or mismatch of the two
partners' pictures. We predicted that if individuals represent their
partner's task even if it is non-verbal, we would observe a main effect of
partner task. In addition, we predicted that if individuals represent their
partner's response regardless of whether it is verbal, there would be a
main effect of picture congruence, and if individuals represent their
partner's response only if it is verbal, there would be an interaction
between partner task and picture congruence.
Replicating Experiment 1, we observed the expected effect of task
congruence on naming latencies, which were faster on trials where the
partner was also naming than on trials where the partner was per-
forming the categorization task. This again provides support for the
view that individuals mentally represent their partners' task regardless
of whether it requires a verbal response, and that this leads to inter-
ference in naming when the partner's task is different.
We did not observe the predicted effect of picture congruence on
naming latencies. Naming times were numerically faster in the same-
picture than in the different-picture condition, but this 12msec differ-
ence did not reach significance. In Experiment 1, an effect of picture
congruence had been observed, with latencies being shorter in the
same-picture same-task condition (the only condition where both
speakers produced the same word) than in the remaining conditions.
Together, these results suggest interference may sometimes arise due to
the content of a partner's speech, though the effect appears to be less
robust than the effect of partner task.
In Experiment 2, we again observed few fixations to partner objects,
and most of these occurred after the onset of speaking. Replicating
Experiment 1, we observed that the likelihood of fixating the partner
object was higher when the partner picture was different from the
participant's own picture. We also again observed that the likelihood of
fixating the partner object was higher when both participants were
performing the same task than when they were engaged in different
tasks. This is again consistent with the characterization of the joint
naming task as a form of joint action, such as naming in chorus.
4. General discussion
In two experiments, participants named simple line drawings while
a partner seated next to them was engaged in either the same or a
different task pertaining to either the same or a different picture. This
was a simple, fundamentally non-communicative paradigm that could
easily be performed without any knowledge of the partner's task or
picture, yet we observed robust interference in naming latencies from
the partner's task in both experiments. Participants consistently named
objects faster when their partner was also naming objects than when
their partner was categorizing them, no matter whether the categor-
ization was performed verbally (Experiment 1) or non-verbally
(Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, we also observed significant inter-
ference in naming based upon the partner's speech content. Task con-
gruence effects like those observed in both experiments have been ob-
served in other contexts and are widely discussed in theories of joint
action (e.g. Knoblich et al., 2011; Sebanz et al., 2003, 2006; Vesper
Fig. 5. Distribution of average proportions of fixations to partner pictures by participant in Experiment 2, split by picture congruence (different, same) and partner
task (categorizing, naming). Points represent means by participant; horizontal lines reflect condition means.
Table 4
Logistic mixed effect model for odds of fixating the partner object in Experiment
2 naming trials.
Fixed effects Estimate SE z value p(z)
Intercept −3.47 0.29 −12.02 < 0.001
Partner Task (Categorizing vs. Naming) 0.49 0.11 4.52 < 0.001
Picture Congruence (Same vs. Different) 0.24 0.11 2.23 0.03
Partner Task x Picture Congruence 0.07 0.22 0.31 0.76
Random effects Term Variance
Speaker Picture Intercept 0.01
Partner Picture Intercept 0.06
Participant Intercept 3.21
L. Brehm, et al. Acta Psychologica 199 (2019) 102888
9
et al., 2017). The implication is that our pairs of participants con-
ceptualized their task as a joint one by drawing on their everyday ex-
perience with conversation, despite being fundamentally able to carry
out the task entirely independently of their partner. This supports the
premise suggested in earlier work (e.g. Clark, 1996; Gambi et al., 2015;
Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2013) that language is a form of joint action.
As such, the mechanisms that allow us to co-represent partner speech
affect language, but may not be language-specific.
The results of the current study are consistent with those obtained
by Gambi et al. (2015), who also found strong evidence for re-
presentation of the partner's task with weaker evidence for re-
presentation of specific utterances. This dissociation between re-
presentation of the task and of the content of the partner's speech was
what motivated us to run a similar study. Our expectation had been
that, in a simpler paradigm where the partners were physically present
in the same room, more evidence for the co-representation of speech
content might be found. This expectation was not confirmed: we again
found limited evidence for the co-representation of partner speech
content. In combination with other results from joint language para-
digms (e.g. Corps, Crossley, Gambi, & Pickering, 2018; Hoedemaker
et al., 2017; Hoedemaker & Meyer, 2019; Kuhlen & Rahman, 2017), this
suggests that while individuals can represent what the partner will say
in fine-grained detail, partial co-representation may often be a useful
default.
Our results point to an important contrast between language and
some of the other joint tasks examined in the literature. For many joint
tasks, one might expect participants to represent their partner's task and
behavior in as much detail as possible. For example, robust interference
is often observed when partners respond to different stimuli or produce
different responses, leading to joint versions of effects like the Simon
effect (e.g. Sebanz et al., 2003) and the flanker effect (Atmaca, Sebanz,
& Knoblich, 2011). The implication is that while individuals are capable
of representing their partner's behavior in joint tasks in much detail, the
language tasks examined so far have elicited only partial co-re-
presentation. We speculate that the participants' tendency to resort to
partial co-representation may come from their experience with con-
versation. Awareness of the interlocutor and the fact that they are likely
to speak may be foundational for smooth turn-taking, but generating
precise predictions about the content of a partner's utterances may be
dysfunctional, as it would interfere with a speaker's own speech plan-
ning processes (see Hoedemaker & Meyer, 2019, for similar arguments.)
Other forms of joint action may also be best supported by partial co-
representations. Consider the joint tasks of lifting a piano versus playing
a piano duet. Precise predictions about the partner's movements to the
millimeter and timing to the millisecond are unnecessary to lift a piano
in synchrony, but might be required for playing it in synchrony. We
leave the question of which other forms of joint action lead to partial
co-representations for future work.
4.1. Comparison to other joint naming studies
Though our findings are consistent with the main results reported
by Gambi et al. (2015), two differences merit brief discussion. While we
observed an effect of task interference, as in Gambi et al. (2015), the
direction of this effect was reversed. In their Experiment 2, Gambi et al.
(2015) observed more interference for partner-name than partner-ca-
tegorize trials. (The remaining experiments in their study did not in-
clude a categorization task, but instead featured a partner no-response
condition). We consistently observed the opposite, with increased in-
terference for partner-categorize trials observed in both Experiments 1
and 2. The reason for this reversal might be methodological. First, note
that the studies differed both in the naming and categorization tasks:
The participants in Gambi et al. (2015) named two objects or cate-
gorized whether or not they belonged to the same semantic category.
By contrast, the participants in our experiments named only one object
or categorized it as being animate or inanimate. Due to these task
differences, it is possible that there was a relative benefit from re-
presenting a shared task in our study, or less interference derived from
representing different tasks. Further experiments including an addi-
tional partner no-task condition would be necessary to distinguish these
possibilities. We also note that our task was less demanding than the
task in Gambi et al. (2015), which could have led to an overall re-
duction of interference based on the partner object's name; this could
also potentially have contributed to the reversal of the effect. In sum,
though the reversal of the task effects between the two studies was
unexpected, it is important to note that both convincingly showed that
the participants represented their partners' tasks.
A second difference between our studies and those of Gambi et al.
(2015) is that we found more evidence than they did for the re-
presentation of the partner's speech content. This resulted in a sig-
nificant interaction in Experiment 1, where we found that when both
participants were producing the same response (the same-picture,
partner-name condition), naming latencies tended to be the fastest. In
Experiment 2, the experimental conditions patterned numerically in the
same direction, with the fastest naming latencies in the same-picture,
partner-name condition but the effect was not significant. This means
that despite some superficial differences, the overall pattern of content
interference still matches Gambi et al. (2015), who found that the
content of partner speech occasionally influenced error rates.
The consistent effects of task co-representation and weaker effects of
content co-representation observed in our experiments and in Gambi
et al. (2015) are informative when placed against work by Corps et al.
(2018). This study used a communicative joint naming task in which
individuals had to respond to a partner utterance by either answering a
question (“Have you visited the city of Paris?”) with a yes/no response
or by using a key-press to predict when the end of the question was
upcoming. When participants had to respond to the utterance content
by answering the questions, the latencies were affected by the pre-
dictability of the question-final words, demonstrating the co-re-
presentation of utterance content. However, when participants only had
to respond to end of the utterance, content predictability did not
matter, demonstrating that a full co-representation of partner content is
not always formed. This pattern highlights the fact that representations
of content can be recruited and used when needed. In other words, the
degree of co-representation is likely to be flexible such that individuals
can and do predict partner content when it is important for their own
speech plan.
4.2. Representations of partner utterances and overt visual attention
We collected eye-tracking data in order to examine the link between
interference in naming and visual attention. In both experiments, we
found more interference in naming latencies when the partner was
performing a different task, while attention to partner objects followed
the opposite pattern. Given the visual angle between the two pictures, it
is unlikely that participants could have attended to the partner image
without directly fixating it. This means that interference in naming
latencies did not rely on overt visual attention to the partner object.
Instead, we found that participants looked infrequently at the
partner object, and did so most often after producing their own re-
sponse. This means that fixations to partner objects did not reflect vi-
sual attention recruited for speech planning (contra most usages of eye-
tracking in language production research). We speculate that since
looks to the partner object occurred more often when the joint task was
easy (in the partner name condition) and when there was new in-
formation to be gained (in the different picture condition), fixations to
partner objects might have occurred simply because time remained at
the end of the trial and there were only two possible pictures to fixate.
One might also speculate that fixations to partner object may have been
more frequent in the same task than in the different task condition
because in the former condition participants felt more strongly that
they were engaged in a joint task with the partner.
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4.3. Joint naming and conversation
To situate our findings within the larger literature, we note that
arguably the largest contribution to the study of dialogue follows from a
conversation analysis perspective (e.g. Levinson & Torreira, 2015;
Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1978). This work has demonstrated that
individuals have the ability to tightly coordinate their utterances in
naturalistic conversations, implying that in order to converse fluently,
individuals must co-represent some aspects of their partner's utterances.
The present work, as well as earlier related work (e.g. Corps et al.,
2018; Hoedemaker et al., 2017; Hoedemaker & Meyer, 2019; Kuhlen &
Rahman, 2017; Meyer et al., 2018) departed from a naturalistic para-
digm to use a classic experimental psycholinguistic design (simple,
normed items presented in randomized blocks that are in turn presented
in a counterbalanced order)—in essence, treating language as a simple
form of action. This strand of work illustrates the role for psycho-
linguistic laboratory studies for understanding conversation, and we
hope that our work inspires future studies in this domain. We believe
that by combining experimental studies with more naturalistic work
from a conversation analysis perspective, we can gain a clearer un-
derstanding about what individuals and dyads do when they talk to
each other.
We also suggest that this work further demonstrates the need to
consider dyadic speech in psycholinguistic processing theories. In
conversations, individuals do not produce parallel monologues, but
represent aspects of their interlocutors' plans. While most research on
language production focuses on single individuals producing de-con-
textualized utterances, understanding how individuals balance the
needs to listen and plan simultaneously provides insight into basic
mechanisms of language production. The implication from our work
and from other joint naming tasks is that partner utterances can lead to
interference for multiple reasons; this means that speaking in dialogue
may differ both in attentional control processes and in speech planning
processes from speaking in monologue.
5. Conclusion
Replicating earlier findings by Gambi et al. (2015), we found that
dyads of speakers strongly represent whether both individuals are en-
gaged in the same or different tasks, leading to interference in naming
latencies. However, individuals did not seem to strongly represent
whether they both saw the same or different stimuli or responded in the
same or different ways. This provides evidence that co-representations
of partner speech may be coarse-grained and partial. We propose that
the use of such coarse partner representations may arise from the
functionality of coarse representations of partner's speech in everyday
conversation. To take turns successfully, one needs to expect that the
conversation partner will also want to speak, but to listen successfully,
one does not need to form detailed expectations of what is going to be
said.
Appendix A. Items
Category Dutch name English name Visual complexity Log frequency Number syllables Name agreement Normed RT
Non-living Broek Pants 16.6 1 1 91 804
Non-living Hoed Hat 9.87 1.61 1 100 862
Non-living Trui Sweater 12.4 1.30 1 77 977
Non-living Jas Coat 14.5 1.69 1 82 1067
Non-living Rok Skirt 10 1.49 1 85 1065
Non-living Tafel Table 12.9 2.39 2 100 734
Non-living Bed Bed 14.5 2.48 1 97 830
Non-living Stoel Armchair 12.4 1.18 2 73 1017
Non-living Kast Dresser 21.3 1.68 1 81 1082
Non-living Bureau Desk 18.2 1.94 2 87 1118
Non-living Auto Car 10.4 2.32 2 100 694
Non-living Fiets Bike 24.4 1.68 1 100 759
Non-living Vliegtuig Plane 17.3 1.72 2 100 831
Non-living Bus Bus 23.3 1.76 1 100 955
Non-living Boot Boat 17.7 1.83 1 87 1061
Living Slang Snake 23.9 1.43 1 100 772
Living Olifant Elephant 24.5 1 3 100 788
Living Konijn Rabbit 12.2 1.36 2 100 813
Living Muis Mouse 14 1.32 1 86 997
Living Bij Bee 13 3.58 1 54 1252
Living Appel Apple 9.37 1.38 2 100 856
Living Citroen Lemon 9.68 1.04 2 97 901
Living Peer Pear 19.3 1 1 100 914
Living Aardbei Strawberry 17.3 0.70 2 100 917
Living Kers Cherry 5.8 0.70 1 89 1019
Living Paddestoel Mushroom 9.51 0.95 3 95 872
Living Wortel Carrot 14.1 1.57 2 94 885
Living Tomaat Tomato 9.57 0.95 2 97 912
Living Sla Lettuce 17.6 0.48 1 66 986
Living Mais Corn 16.7 0.90 1 92 1005
Appendix B. Categorization latencies and fixation patterns
Both experiments included conditions where both partners named the pictures and conditions where one of them named the picture, while the
partner categorized it. The design omitted the condition where both participants categorized the pictures. Therefore, we cannot assess the task
interference effect on performance in the categorization task. Other results from the categorization conditions are reported below.
Experiment 1
There were no reliable differences in mean categorization latencies based on any predictors in a linear mixed effect model (Table B1), though
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there was a numerical trend for slower categorization latencies in the partner-present condition (752ms) than the partner-absent condition (720ms).
Individuals were significantly more likely to fixate the partner object when it differed from their own (7.5%, versus 5.4% for same-picture trials).
This was confirmed with a logistic mixed effect model (see Table B2); no other main effects or interactions were reliable.
Experiment 2
Participants only provided a response in the recorded time window for 76% of categorization trials, with the correct response given on 1975 trials
(72%) and the incorrect response given on 121 trials (4%). On 658 trials (24%), no latency was recorded, indicating a response time longer than
1000ms or no response, and on 6 trials, the participant did the wrong task. We attribute the large amount of missing data to a coding error that
recorded latencies only for the 1000ms that the picture was present on the screen.
For the recorded response latencies, there were no reliable differences between conditions in a linear mixed effect model (see Table B3).
Individuals were numerically more likely to fixate the partner object when it differed from their own (8%, versus 3% for same-picture trials) but this
was not significant in a logistic mixed effect model, nor were any other main effects or interactions (see Table B4).
Table B1
Linear mixed effect model of log-transformed categorization latencies in Experiment 1. For these trials, the partner was always naming.
Fixed effects Estimate SE t value p(χ2)
Intercept 6.579 0.014 474.90 <0.001
Partner Presence (Present vs Absent) 0.035 0.026 1.34 0.18
Picture Congruence (Same vs. Different) −0.008 0.004 −1.70 0.09
Partner Presence × Picture Congruence 0.001 0.009 0.17 0.87
Random effects Term Variance
Speaker Picture Intercept 0.000




Logistic mixed effect model for odds of fixating the partner object in Experiment 1 categorizing trials. For these trials, the partner was always naming.
Fixed effects Estimate SE z value p(z)
Intercept −4.18 0.28 −14.83 <0.001
Partner Presence (Present vs Absent) 0.11 0.48 0.24 0.81
Picture Congruence (Same vs. Different) 0.42 0.13 3.19 <0.01
Partner Presence × Picture Congruence 0.24 0.26 0.93 0.35
Random effects Term Variance
Speaker Picture Intercept 0.00
Partner Picture Intercept 0.29
Participant Intercept 4.09
Table B3
Linear mixed effect model of log-transformed categorization latencies in Experiment 2. For these trials, the partner was always naming. In the random effects tier,
random slopes are nested below the corresponding intercept.
Fixed effects Estimate SE t value p(χ2)
Intercept 6.42 0.018 364.6 <0.001
Picture Congruence (Same vs. Different) −0.001 0.015 −0.1 0.93
Random effects Term Variance
Speaker Picture Intercept 0.000
Picture Congruence 0.000
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Table B4
Logistic mixed effect model for odds of fixating the partner object in Experiment 2 categorizing trials. For these trials, the partner was always naming. In the random
effects tier, random slopes are nested below the corresponding intercept.
Fixed effects Estimate SE t value p(z)
Intercept −3.69 0.28 −12.95 <0.001
Picture Congruence (Same vs. Different) 0.32 0.36 0.89 0.37
Random effects Term Variance
Speaker Picture Intercept 0.002
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